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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 24, 1982 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 82-556
PRESS-ENTERPRISE
COMPANY(Newspaper
publisher)

Cert to Cal. Ct. App.
(McDaniel) (order)

v.
SUPERIOR COURT

1.

State/Civil

SUMMARY: Petr challenges the exclusion

lie from voir dire proceedings in a capital case and
of the transcript of

Timely

- 2 -

2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr, a newspaper pub-

lisher, sought to cover the voir dire stage of a rape-murder trial.

The

trial

judge

(Mortland)

openthe proceedings to the public.

denied

the petr's motion

to

After voir dire, he denied a

motion for access to the transcript, reasoning that the jurors'
right to privacy and the right to a fair trial prevailed over the
right of the public to know.

Both the prosecution and the de-

fense favored denial of access to the public.

The Ct. App. de-

nied a writ of mandate, and the state S.Ct. denied review.

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the voir dire pro-

ceeding is an integral part of the trial process and Globe Newspaper Co v. Superior Court, No. 81-611, Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,

448

US 555

(1980),

and Gannett Company,

Inc.

v.

DePasquale, 443 US 368 (1979), recognize the independent interest
of the public in a public trial.

Allowing the trier of fact to

be selected in secret proceedings endangers the entire judicial
process, according to petr, by casting suspicion on the judiciary.
The California S.Ct. decided in Hovey v. Superior Court, 616
P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980), that jurors were influenced by hearing the
death qualification phase of voir dire of other veniremen.
held,
In order to m1n1m1ze potentially prejudicial
effects identified by the Haney study, this
court declares, pursuant to its supervisory
authority over California criminal procedure,
that in future capital cases that portion of
the voir dire of each prospective juror which
deals with issues which involve death-

It

-

,j

-

qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration.
Id. at 1354.

According to petr, the rule of Hovey is an uncon-

stitutional prior restraint on the exercise of the First Amendment right of the public to an open trial.
sti tu tionally vague and

overbroad~

Further, it is uncon-

the state trial courts have

given it a number of different interpretations.

DISCUSSION:

4.

The petr was also the petr in Press-

Enterprise Co. v. San Diego Superior Court, No. 81-1022, in which
cert

was

denied

last

Justices

Term.

O'Connor would have granted.

Brennan,

Marshall,

and

The only difference between this

petn and No. 81-1022 is that in No. 81-1022, the court only denied the press the right to attend voir dire proceedings but provided a transcript.

The resp in No. 81-1022 argued that the case

was moot · since the voir dire proceedings were over, but the pool
memo concluded -- correctly, I think, see Globe Newspaper, supra
that the problem was capable of repetition yet evading review,
so apparently the mootness argument was not the reason for denial.
The decision below in No. 81-1022 was correct under Richmond
Newspapers and Gannett, for Gannett upheld the closure of a pretrial proceeding on the theory that opening it presented a reasonable

probability

Newspapers,

while

of

prejudice

recognizing

a

to
right

carefully distinguished Gannett as
ings.

See 448 US at 564

(Stewart, J.,

concurring).

the

Richmond

defendant.

to attend

involving

trials,

~trial

(opinion of Burger, C.J.)

~

very

proceed-

id. at 599

Also, the arguments in No. 81-1022

- 4 -

concerning

Hovey,

repeated

here,

seem

to

be

without

merit.

First, Hovey does not mandate closure but only individual death
qualification.

Second, that lower courts apply Hovey differently

in different cases does not mean that it is unconstitutionally
vague.

On the contrary, the individualized application of the

rule tends to show that it is not a prior restraint.
The added feature

in this case, the refusal to release a

transcript of the voir dire proceedings, is problematic.

From

the description of the case in the petn, it appears that this
restriction is not merely
point.

temporary~

a CFR might clarify that

Assuming that it is not temporary, I think that the court

below was wrong.

In Gannett, the Court thought it important that

the denial of access was only temporary.
Once the danger of prejudice had dissipated,
a transcript of the suppression hearing was
The press and the public
made available.
then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the
suppression hearing. Unlike the case of an
absolute ban on access, therefore, the press
here had the opportunity to inform the public
of the details of the pretrial hearing accurately and completely.
Under these circumstances, any First and Fourteenth Amendment
right of the petitionere to attend a criminal
trial was not violated.
443 US at 393.
The petr has not, however, given any indication that the
practice of denying transcripts is a frequent occurence,

and,

given the clarity of the language in Gannett, I doubt that it is.
Given the denial in No. 81-1022 and the language in Gannett, I
recommend a denial here.

- 5 -

There is an amicus brief from the California Newspapers
Association in support of the petn.
November 11, 1982

There is no response.

Smalley

order in petn

~nvrtmt

(!Jllttrt cf tltt 1!lnitth ~taft%'

~rutfrington. ~. C!J. 2ll.;t'l-~
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court

.- ,.

No. 82-556
David A. Charny

October 6, 1983
Question Presented

May the state trial court in a criminal case close voir
dire to the public and seal the transcript of the voir dire
proceedings?

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
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I. Background

This case requires the Court to review resp's ----..,
orders
closing
_........ voir dire proceedings to the public.
~

The orders were

issued during the trial of defendant Brown (not a party here) for
murder and rape of a teenage girl.

Three orders are before the
~----

3

Court for review.

~ before

voir dire began, the trial judge ruled

against petr's motion that voir dire be openly conducted.
1.

App.

He indicated that "individual voir dire with regard to death

qualifications and any other special areas that counsel may feel
some problem with regard to ••• would be in private and not
subject to
App. 93.

scrutiJ~A

the press or anybody else not involved."

Counsel had argued that an open voir dire would inhibit

jurors from candidly disclosing their feelings on issues
important to the trial, particularly with relation to such
matters as attitudes towards the death penalty and past
experience with violent crime.

---

Both prosecution and defense

agreed to the limited closing of voir dire.

The trial judge made

no findings as to the need for closed voir dire, although he did
allude to his concern that defendant have a "fair trial."
87.

-----------------~-------------------~
(~

App.

~ af~er the jury was impaneled, petr moved for
release of a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings.
Petr contended that refusal to release the transcript would
constitute a prior restraint and that other California trial
courts had ordered release in similar circumstances.

App. 54-59.

The trial judge denied the motion without prejudice, stating that

~

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
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the "right to privacy ••• and a right to a fair trial should
prevail [over] the right of the people to know

....

II

App. 121.

~ petr renewed its motion at the conclusion of
trial and sentencing.

The trial judge again denied, finding that
---..

the jurors
_____.., during the closed voir dir~ had discussed "sensitive"

--

experiences not "appropriate for public discussion."

-----------

App. 39.

The Court of Appeal summarily denied a petition for mandamus to
compel release of the transcript, and the California Supreme
Court denied hearing.

Petr had not appealed denial of his first

or second motions.
II. Discussion
A. Mootness

~ ~~ ~~

The question whether transcripts should remain sealed is
clearly not moot.

The propriety of the closure orders is moot,

----

e.

however, unless "capable of rep,fti '' ion, yet evading review."
Under that exception to mootness

doctr~ne,

a controversy is not

considered moot if there is a "reasonable expectation" or
demonstrated probability" that it will recur involving the same
complaining party.
(per curiam)
(1975)

Murphy v. Hunt, 50 u.s.L.W. 4264, 4265 (1982)

(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149

(per curiam)).

In Richmond Newspapers, the Court reviewed

an order closing trial to the public because "it is reasonably
foreseeable that other trials may be closed by other judges
without any more showing of need than is presented on this
record."

448 U.S., at 563 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, announcing the

judgment of the Court).

Similarly, in Nebraska Press Assn. v.

Stuart, 427 u.s. 539, 546-547 (1976), the Court reviewed a prior

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
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restraint on reporting prior to the selection of the jury because
another restrictive order might be entered if the criminal
defendant were re-tried and because the state might seek such an
order, affecting petr newspaper, in other criminal cases.
these cases, none of the questions presented here

Under

~

~

moot:

closure of voir dire has occurred, and will probably continue to
occur, in other trials.

~~

B. Standard of Review for Closure Orders

~

vG lobe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613,~r
2620 (1982), holds that

11

[w] here ••• the State attempts to deny~

the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of ~~
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is ~ ~
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virgina, 448

u.s.

II

Further, Richmond

555 (1980), suggests

the interests which justify the decision should be
in findings. •

;t7~

11

..

v~

tha~

articula a~r

See also, In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer

L

Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167-1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (overruling
trial courts' closure of voir dire not based on adequate
findings).
Because Globe Newspaper, like this case, concerns
closure on the ground that sensitive information must be withheld
from the public, the only question as to the applicability of
this standard might arise if voir dire were a pre-trial
proceeding rather than part of the trial.

Although the

prosecution made this argument below, resp does not press the

-.,

~-------------------------------------------------------------bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court

point here.
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And it seems unquestionable that voir dire is an

integral part of the trial itself.

Each of the state courts and

federal courts of appeals to address the issue, in applying
either the federal constitutional rule of Richmond Newspapers or
state constitutional provisions for an open trial, have
considered impanelment of the jury to be part of trial.

E.g.,

Pulitzer Publishing Co., supra; Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee,
553 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ark. 1977); Rapid City Journal v. Circuit
Court, 283 N.W.2d 563, 566 (S.Dak. 1979); Great Falls Tribune v.
District Court, 60S

~ .2d

116, 121 (Mont. 1980).

Further, the factors which led the court to find a right
of access to criminal trials apply equally to voir dire
proceedings.

First, the court emphasized that the criminal trial

had

~istorically

448

u.s.,

been open to the public. Richmond Newspapers,

at 569, 589; Globe Newspaper, 102 s.ct., at 2619.

Similarly, the vj ury once consisted of the entire body of freemen
~--------~

in the community; when the size of the jury was limited, jurors
were still called from the public gathered at large and
questioned in public as to their qualifications.

See generally,

Amicus brief of the Society of Professional Journalists, at 6-9.
And while, in recent years, in-chambers voir dire or examination
of jurors for improprieties during trial has been occasionally
approved, e.g., United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 451 (2d
Cir. 1979) (no objection from counsel); United States v. Miller,
381 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1967), these cases involve challenges to
this procedure by defendants under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 43 (which

page 7.
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requires the presence of defendant at trial) , rather than by the
press on first amendment grounds.
Second, in Virginia Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the
Court found the right of access particularly important to the
functioning of the judicial process:
the factfinding process,

~sters

it enhances the quality of

an appearance of fairness, and

~ermits the public to participate in the judicial process by
observing and discussing its operation.
102 s.ct., at 2620.

E.g., Globe Newspaper,

As courts have recognized, publicity may

serve similar functions for voir dire by demonstrating the
fairness of the process of jury selection and by exposing to
public scrutiny both the statements made by veniremen and the
conduct of the judge and counsel.

E.g., Commercial Printing Co.,

553 S.W.2d, at 273.__ Thus, the requirements of Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper appear fully applicable to the
conduct of voir dire.
c. Application of the Standard
1. Required findings. -- As noted above, the trial court ·

~fde ~o_! indin~ in
~dire.

support of its initial order to close voir

The court mentions only the criminal defendant's

~~ entitlement

to a fair trial, without explaining how this is

furthered at all by closing voir dire to the public.

The court's

reasoning can only be surmised by reading counsel's arguments.
This is insufficient-L particularly where, as discussed below,
there is no California precedent either authorizing or explaining
the rationale for closure of voir dire.

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
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The trial court made only conclusory findings in support
of its second order to close voir dire and its order to seal the
transcript.

These findings are not sufficiently specific to

justify the closure order.

Allusion to "special experiences in

sensitive areas" not "appropriate for public discussion," App.
39, or to "private information," App. 66, does not give a
reviewing court or to public observers information sufficient to
evaluate the strength of the jurors' interest in privacy as
against the public's right of access to trials.
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court reversed despite the
inadequacy of the trial court's findings, rather than remanding
for further findings.

448 U.S., at 580-581 (CHIEF JUSTICE

BURGER, announcing the judgment of the Court). However, in that
case, remand would have been futile, because the closed trial had
already been conducted.

~

Here, in contrast, whether the

l.--....

transcripts should be sealed remains a live issue.

~ .y..LJ"'"'

~T-

The Court

should remand for further findings by the trial court on

t~~

~~,..

because, as I shall argue below, proper findings may

~

substantial interests that justify sealing of the
transcript in this case.

~· ~

~

2. State interests in closure of voir dire. -- In

addition to the absence of findings, the trial court's two
closure orders might be reversed on the ground that no
substantive interests justify closure._ Two arguments supporting
closure appear in the record of the proceedings below.

First,

closure encourages candor on the part of prospective jurors and
thereby aids in selection of an unbiased panel.

Second, closure

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
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protects the privacy of jurors who honestly answer sensitive
questions posed during voir dire.
Initially, it should be noted

that~as

a justification

for closed voir dire, the second interest is premised upon the
first.

If the prosecution or defense had no interest in close

personal questioning of prospective jurors, jurors' privacy could
be protected merely by prohibiting questions that infringed
unduly upon that privacy, or, indeed, any questions to which the
jurors themselves objected.

As resp concedes, Resp. Br. at 15,

courts have traditionally granted jurors a privilege to refuse to
answer questions which might incriminate or embarrass them.

See,

e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979)
{upholding reasonable limitations on question to protect jurors
from "inquiry into their essentially private concerns").

In

California, the trial court exercises "considerable discretion
••• to contain voir dire within reasonable limits." People v.
Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (1981).

And even if jurors had no

privilege to decline to answer unduly intrusive voir dire
questions, recognizing such a privilege now would be a "least

-

restrictive alternative" to closing voir dire altogether •.
There is reason to doubt the state's interest in
receiving candid answers to the types of questions apparently
~----------~--~------

asked of the ·urors in this case. This interest has not been
explicitly articulated, as far as I can determine, in California
case law.

People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869 (1981), which changed

California law to permit questions relevant to peremptory
challenges, does contain some strong rhetoric about the

page 10.
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defendant's "substantial right" to "resonable latitude in the
examination of prospective jurors as to their qualifications

. .."

and the desirability for "extensive and probing" voir dire.
However, nothing in the opinion indicates any state interest in
information about themselves that jurors might wish to keep
private; rather, the opinion emphasizes the right to ask about
attitudes that might have a bearing on the jurors' reactions to a
case.

Id., at n. 9.

Jurors have no strong reason to conceal

their attitudes on subjects such as the death penalty, the
trustworthiness of policemen, or violent crime (examples cited in
People v. Williams.)

There is no conflict between a reasonably

probing, public voir dire on juror attitudes and the jurors'
interest in privacy.
Further, there is no suggestion in California law that
individuals might be less than candid in discussing these
attitudes simply because voir dire is public.

Williams does not

touch on the issue at all, and Hovey v. Suprerior Court, 616 P.2d
1301, 1347-1354 (1980), cited by the trial ccourt below, concerns
the desirability of isolating jurors from each other during voir
dire so that they will not be influenced by each others' answers
to questions and by the repeated questions asked of each of them
by counsel. Hovey therefore does not justify isolating jurors
from the public, merely from each other during questioning. And,
as noted above, conducting voir dire in public has been
recognized to

encourag ~ onest

it does by witnesses.

I~

answers by prospective jurors, as
conclude, then, that there is no
~

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior CQur!
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state interest in 61osed voir dir~~ at least as these interests

-------------

are now articulated by California law.
3. State interests in sealing the transcript. -- Aside
from a general interest in the conduct of voir dire in this
personal manner, the state and jurors have a particular interest
in sealing the transcript in this case because of the "implied
promise of confidentiality" given to the jurors.

Surely, jurors

have a legitimate claim to have this promise honored,
particularly when they have relied upon it in revealing
information about themselves; and the state has an interest in
honoring those promises that it does make.

The record contains a

number of representations of highly personal revelations on the
part of jurors: for example, counsel for defendant represents, in
his amicus brief at 6, that some jurors revealed that they had
been victims of sexual abuse.

The interest in honoring the

state's promise to preserve such statements from public
disclosure seems legitimate, regardless of the validity of the
underlying closure order from which the promise of
confidentiality presumably stems.
I do not believe the Court has considered a case which
required it to balance a first amendment right with rights to
withhold information about oneself from public dissemination. 1
1cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469 (1975), held that
a state may not prohibit publ1cation of a rape victim's name in
order to protect privacy. However, the Court emphasized there
that "[b]y placing the information in the public domain on
official court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being served."
Footnote continued on next page.

bench memo: Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
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~

r)

The Court has approved, however, the common law doctrine that
court records may be closed from the
-------------------- ~

pu~lic

-

to further a variety

~~--------------

of privacy interests, including that in preventing the

dissemination of scandalous or embarrassing information.

See

~Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 u.s. 589, 597-599
(1978).

As Warner Communications indicates, the balance must be

struck on a case-by-case basis, weighing the public's need for
access to the information contained in particular records against
the harm disclosure may work on the individuals affected.

See,

e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 219 (6th Cir. 1982)
(sealing part of record of investigation of National Guard
'--.

conduct during campus disturbances).
The common law doctrine suggests that protecting the
statements purportedly made by some of the jurors in this case,
under circumstances where confidentiality is promised, may rise
to the level of a compelling state interest under Globe
Newspapers.
~ ~.

~

cor::_lusion

,b !Jhere is insufficient support for such a
i~recor~

of the present

c~se.

~rd indicate th~~nts were in fakt made.

~court
~ releasing

Further,

did not consider the less restrictive alternative
a redacted transcript from which statements too private

~, to be justifiably disclosed had been removed.

~~reman~

t-1-.

No findings in the

r..;;,.}wt/'

Thus, the Court

a propriate findings and for consideration of

~

/: . -A~
~, at 495. Here, in contrast, resp seeks to keep the records
~v· ~ut of public view altogether. Similarly, no right to privacy
was at issue in Globe Newspaper, because the transcript of the
closed trial would eventually be released. 102 s.ct., at 2622.

page 13.
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this alternative.
III. Conclusion

0 ">

The - orders closing voir dire to the public should be
~eser ~d

because it is supported neither by findings made in this

case nor by state interests as articulated in California law.
Such orders should be based upon a strong state policy shown by
specific findings to be applicable in a given case.

Th~jer seali~the transcript~hould_be

vacated, and

the case remanded for further proceedings to permit the trial
court either to reverse its order or to make appropriate factual
findings in support of it.

-

Remand rather than reversal

~

justified for three reasons. ~ the common law and federal
constitutional precedents support, or at least are consistent
with, a recognition that privacy interests may outweight a first
amendment right of access to court records of past proceedings.
~-

~ the tria \ did find, albeit in very general terms, that
the jurors had a strong interest in the privacy of the
transcripts in this case, while the record before the Court
contains specific indications that the trial court's conclusions
may be justified. c=T~~ remand w~
'll ermit tqe trial court to
<~~

~

-:)

fashion a remedy which better accommm aates tne competing
interests here than would full disclosure of an unedited
transcript.

lfp/ss 10/10/83
82-555 Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
This memo, summarizing points in David's bench
memo, is merely a memory aid.
Facts and Issue
This California case resulted in the conviction of ·
a defendant of rape and murder of a teenage girl.
sentenced to death.

He was

The question, one left open in Richmond

Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co. is whether - and under
what circumstances - a state trial court may close voir dire
to the public during the examination of jurors, and thereafter seal the transcript permanently.
Three orders are here for review:

(i) with ap-

proval of counsel for both sides and before voir dire began
the TC denied petitioner's (Press Enterprise) motion that
voir dire be conducted openly; (ii) after voir dire was completed, and jury impaneled, the TC denied motion to release
a transcript of voir dire; and (iii) at the end of trial and
sentencing, the TC again denied such a motion, finding that
some jurors had discussed "sensitive" experiences.
The California Court of Appeals and the State Supreme Court both summarily upheld the TC's rulings.
The issues are not moot.

See Richmond Newspapers

(capable of reception yet evading review), also, final sealing of voir dire record of course is not moot.

2.

Standard of Review
In Globe Newspaper Co.

(1982} we said the state

must show that denial is required by a compelling governmental interest, and that least restrictive means should be
used.
Although the CJ has indicated in a concurring
opinion in Gannett that the term "trial" does not include
pretrial motions, it is clear that voir dire is a part of a
trial.
A difficulty with the state's position here is
that, apart from general references to a "fair trial", "sensitive quetions", and privacy, the TC made no findings.
State Interests as Argued
It is said that closure encourages candor, and
protects privacy (the latter, of course, being related to
the first}.
Absent more specific findings, these interests are
inadequate.

No evidence as to whether a generalization this

broad is justified.

Moreover, courts usually grant jurors

the privilege of refusing to answer questions that embarras&. '
them.

David recommends, and I am inclined to agree>that the

alleged state interests do noisupport closing the voir dire.

---=--

ad

State Interests Are Greater with Respect to Permant Sealing
7
\
of Transcript
There is at least an implied promise of confidentiality given to jurors once they serve on the panel.

r,

'

Both

3.

the state and the iurors have a legitimate interest in the
honoring of this promise.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
489, 597-599 (1978), we recognized - as a common law doc-

tvf~~~-e'
· privacy
(

trine - that court records may be closed
ests.

inter~'#~ .. ;

(1) Reverse the orders closing voir dire as not

supported by any findings made.
(2) Vacate and remand the order permanently seal-

ing the transcript, and require the TC either to reverse the
order or to make appropriate factual findings in support of
it.

A different decision with respect to the permanent

sealing is justified by the recognition - at common law in
our cases - that privacy interests may outweigh a First
Amendment right of access to court records of past proceedings.

The trial court, at least, did find - though in gen-

eral terms - that jurors had a strong privacy interest.
Moreover, a remand may permit the trial court to adopt
"least restrictive means" to accommodate the competing
interests.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-£56
PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
RIVERSIDE COUNTY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
[January-, 1984]
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the court. I(,
We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of ~
open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings ~
for the voir dire examination of potential jurors.
~ f

q

I
Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was tried and convicted of
the rape and murder of a teenage girl, and sentenced to death
in California Superior Court. Before the voir dire examination of prospective jurors began, petitioner, Press-Enterprise Co., moved that the voir dire be open to the public and
the press. Petitioner contended that the public had an absolute right to attend the trial, and asserted that the trial commenced with the voir dire proceedings. The State opposed
petitioner's motion, arguing that if the press were present,
juror responses would lack the candor necessary to assure a
fair trial.
The trial judge agreed and permitted petitioner to attend
only the "general voir dire." He stated that counsel would
conduct the "individual voir dire with regard to death qualifications and any other special areas that counsel may feel
some problem with regard to ... in private .... " App. 93.
The voir dire consumed six weeks and all but approximately
three days was closed to the public.
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After the jury was empaneled, petitioner moved the trial
court to release a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge
described the responses of prospective jurors at their voir
dire:
"Most of them are of little moment. There are a few,
however, in which some personal problems were discussed which could be somewhat sensitive as far as
publication of those particular individual's situations are
concerned." App. 103.
Counsel for Brown argued that release of the transcript
would violate the jurors' right of privacy. The prosecutor
agreed, adding that the prospective jurors had answered
questions under an "implied promise of confidentiality."
App. 111. The court denied petitioner's motion, concluding
as follows:
"I agree with much of what defense counsel and People's
counsel have said and I also, regardless of the public's
right to know, I also feel that's rather difficult that by a
person performing their civic duty as a prospective juror
putting their private information as open to the public
which I just think there is certain areas that the right of
privacy should prevail and a right to a fair trial should
prevail and the right of the people to know, I think
should have some limitations, so at this stage, the motion
to open up the individual sequestered voir dire proceedings is denied without prejudice." App. 121.
After Brown had been convicted and sentenced to death,
petitioner again applied for release of the transcript. In denying this application, the judge stated:
"The jurors were questioned in private relating to past
experiences, and while most of the information is dull
and boring, some of the jurors had some special experiences in sensitive areas that do not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." App. 39.
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Petitioner then sought in the California Court of Appeal a
writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to release the
transcript and vacate the order closing the voir dire proceedings. The petition was denied. The California Supreme
Court denied petitioner's request for a hearing. We granted
certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). We reverse.
II

The trial of a criminal case places the factfinding function in
a jury of twelve unless by statute or consent the jury is fixed
at a lesser number or a jury is waived. The process of juror
selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the
adversaries but to the criminal justice system. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 569
(1980), the plurality opinion summarized the evolution of the
criminal trial as we know it today and concluded that "at the
time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
both here and in England had long been presumptively
open." A review of the historical evidence is also helpful for
present purposes. It reveals that, since the development of
trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for good
cause t:hl"evffi.
A
The roots of open trials reach back to the days before the
Norman Conquest when cases in England were brought before "moots" a town meeting kind of body such as the local
court of the hundred or the county court. 1 Attendance was
virtually compulsory on the part of the freemen of the community, who represented the "patria," or the "country," in
rendering judgment. The public aspect thus was "almost a
necessary incident of jury trials, since the presence of a jury
'Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 1 Select Essarys
in Anglo-American Legal History 88, 89 (1907).
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already insured the presence of a large part of the
public." 2
As the jury system evolved in the years after the Norman
Conquest, and the jury came to be but a small segment representing the community, the obligation of all freeman to attend criminal trials was relaxed; however, the public character of the proceedings, including jury selection, remained
unchanged. Later, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the jury became an impartial trier of facts, owing in
large part to a development in that period, allowing challenges. 3 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332,
335 (7th ed. 1956). Since then, the accused has generally enjoyed the right to challenge jurors in open court at the outset
of the trial. 4
Although there appear to be few contemporary accounts of
the process of jury selection of that day, 5 one early record
Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (13th ed. 1800).
8
In 1352, a statute was enacted to permit challenges to petit jurors on
the ground of their participation as "indicators" on the presenting jury. 25
Edw. 3, C. 3, § 5; see T. Plunkett, A Concise History of Common Law 109
(1929). Objections had always been allowed on grounds of personal hostility. 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332, 324-25 (7th ed.
1956).
'In Peter Cook's Trial, 4 Har. St. Tr. 736, 738-740 (0. B. 1696), the
accused himself attempted to pose questions directly to jurors in order to
sustain challenges. "You may ask upon a Voyer Dire, whether he [the juror] have any Interest in the Cause; nor shall we deny you Liberty to ask
whether he be fitly qualified, according to Law by having a Freehold of
sufficent Value." Id., at 736. And in Harrison's Trial, 2 Har. St. Tr.
309, 313 (0. B. 1660), the reporter remarks that the defendant's persistence in challenging jurors provoked laughter in the courtroom: "Here the
People seemed to laugh," he writes, upon the defendant's tenth peremptory challenge.
5
As noted in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 565 n. 5, it is not
surprising that there is little in the way of contemporary record of the
openness of those early trials. Historians have commented that early Anglo-Saxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that which
2
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written in 1565 places the trial "[i]n the towne house, or in
some open or common place." T. Smith, De Republica
Anglorum 96 (Alston ed. 1906). Smith explained that "there
is nothing put in writing but the enditement":
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so
many as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men
may heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses what is saide." Id., at 101 (emphasis added).
If we accept this account it appears that beginning in the sixteenth century, jurors were selected in public.
As the trial began, the judge and the accused were
present. Before calling jurors, the judge "telleth the cause
of their comming, and [thereby] giveth a good lesson to the
people." Id., at 96-97 (emphasis added). The indictment
was then read; if the accused pleaded not guilty, the jurors
were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant
was allowed to make his challenges. I d., at 98. Smith
makes clear that the entire trial proceeded "openly, that not
only the xii [12 jurors], but the Judges, the parties and as
many [others] as be present may heare." Id., at 79 (emphasis added).
This open process gave assurance to those not attending
trials that others were able to observe the proceedings and
enhanced public confidence. The presence of bystanders
served yet another purpose according to Blackstone. If
challenges kept a sufficient number of qualified jurors from
appearing at the trial, "either party may pray a tales." 3 W.
Blackstone, supra, at 364; see also M. Hale, The History of
the Common Law of England 342 (6th ed. 1820). A "tales"
was the balance necessary to supply the deficiency. 6
every village elder knows?"

E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law

3-4 (2d ed. 1922).
6
By the statute 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1543), the judge was empowered to

award a "tales de circumstantibus, of persons present in court, to be joined
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The presumptive openness of the jury selection process in
England, not surprisingly, carried over into proceedings in
colonial America. For example, several accounts noted the
need for talesmen at the trials of Thomas Preston and William Wemms, two of the British soldiers who were charged
with murder after the so-called Boston Massacre in 1770. 7
Public jury selection thus was the common practice in America when the Constitution was adopted.
B

For present purposes, how we allocate the "right" to openness as between the accused and the public, or whether we
view it as a component inherent in the system benefitting
both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of
the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's
right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the
community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of justice today as it did for centuries before our
separation from England. The value of openness lies in the
fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followe~and that deviations -:{1:=
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness
so essential to public confidence in the system.
to the other jurors to try the cause." 3 W. Blackstone, supra, at 365. If
the judge issued such a writ, the sheriff brought forward "talesmen" from
among the bystanders in the courtroom. These .talesmen were then subject to the same challenges as the others.
7
3 Legal Papers of John Adams 18 (1965) (quoting William Palfrey to
John Wilkes, Oct. 1770, in Elsey, "John Wilkes and William Palfrey," 34
Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 411, 423-425 (1943)); id., at 49 n. 9 (quoting Acting
Governor Thomas Hutchinson in C. B. Mayo ed., Additions to Hutchinson's History 32); id. , at 100.
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at
56!}...-571.
This openness has what is sometimes described as a "community therapeutic value." Id., at 570. Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even
outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community
urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done. See T.
Reik, The Compulsion to Confess 288-295, 408 (1959).
Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrelevant. When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an
outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and
emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet
and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public
proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the
community in knowing that offenders are being brought to
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly
selected. See United States v. Hasting, - - U. S. - - ,
(1983); Morris v. Slappy,- U. S. ,(1983).
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572. Closed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that
outweighs the value of openness. 8 The presumption of
8

That for certain purposes, e. g. , double jeopardy, a trial begins when
witness, Wade v. Hunter, 366 U. S. 684, 688 (1949), Qr the Jurors,
Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963), are sworn does not bear
on the question presented here. The rules of attachment of jeopardy represent the broad perception that the Government's action has reached the
point where its power to retrace its steps must be checked by the "countervailing interests of the individual protected by the double jeopardy clause
of the Fifth Amendment. " United States v. Velazquez, 490 F . 2d 29, 34
(CA2 1973); accord United States v. Jam, 400 U. S. 470, 480 (1971). By
contrast, the question we address-whether the voir dire process must be
open-focuses on First, rather than Fifth, Amendment values and the historical backdrop against which the First Amendment was enacted.
th~first

7
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openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The
interest is to be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the
closure order was properly entered. We now turn to
whether the presumption of openness has been rebutted in
this case.
III
Although three days of voir dire in this case were open to
the public, six weeks of the proceedings were closesf, and media requests for the transcript were denied. 9 The Superior
Court asserted two interests in support of its closure order
and orders denying a transcript: the right of the defendant to
a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective jurors,
for any whose "special experiences in sensitive areas . . . do
not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Supra,
at - - . Of course the right of an accused to fundamental
fairness and the ri ht of ros ective 'urors to rivac are
comBelling interests. But the a · ornia court's conclusion
thatS'*titli Jrmellament and privacy interests were sufficient
to warrant prolonged closure was unsupported by findings
showing that an open proceeding in fact threatened those interests; 10 hence it is not possible to conclude that closure was
We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length, in and
of itself undennines public confidence in the courts and the legal profession. The process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one.
Judges, not advocates, must control that process to make sure privileges
are not so abused. Properly conducted it is inconceivable that the process
could extend over such a period. We note, however, that in response to
questions counsel stated that it is not unknown in California courts for jury
selection to extend six months.
10
We have previously noted that in some limited circumstances, closure
may be warranted. Thus a trial judge may, "in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.
'[T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge ... the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
9
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warranted. 11 The trial court's orders denying access to voir
dire testimony also failed to consider whether alternatives
were available to protect the interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court's orders sought to guard. Absent
consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could
not constitutionally close the voir dire.
We turn to consider whether alternatives to closure were
available to protect asserted privacy rights of prospective jurors. The trial involved testimony concerning an alleged
rape of a teenage girl. Some questions may have been appropriate to prospective jurors that would give rise to legitimate privacy interests of those persons. For example a prospective juror might privately inform the judge that she, or a
member of her family, had been raped but had declined to
seek prosecution because of the embarassment and emotional
trauma from the very disclosure of the episode. The privacy
rights of such a prospective juror must be balanced against
the historic values we have discussed and the need for
opennessof the process.
associated with resort to public places.'" Richmond Newspapers, 448
U. S., at 555 n. 18 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941)).
11
Petitioner contends that respondent's closure order was based on the
requirement in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80, 616 P. 2d 1301
(1980), that jurors answer voir dire questions concerning juror death qualifications "outside the presence of ... fellow venirepersons.'' The docket
sheet merely states, however, that petitioner's motion to be admitted to
jury voir dire "is denied and granted in part, as stated on the record."
The transcript of hearing on the motion is unenlightening on this score.
See App. 93. Thus, it is not clear that the judge's ruling was based on
Hovey.
Assuming that Hovey was the basis for the trial court's order, it is unclear that the interests Hovey sought to protect could have justified respondent's closure order. In Hovey, the California Supreme Court focused on studies that indicated that jurors were prejudiced by the answers
of other jurors during voir dire. There was no indication that the presence
of the public or press affected jurors. The California Supreme Court in
fact stated that its decision would not "in any way affect the open nature of
a trial. " 28 Cal. 3d, at 80-81.
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To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legitimate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control
of the process of jury selection and should inform the array of
prospective jurors, once the general nature of sensitive questions is made known to them, that those individuals believing
public questioning will prove damaging because of
embarassment, may properly request an opportunity to
present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel
present and on the record.
By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative
request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid
basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of unnecessary closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the
court may lead to excusing such a person from jury service.
When limited closure is ordered, the constitutional values
sought to be protected by holding open proceedings may be
satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceedings available within a reasonable time, if the judge determines that disclosure can be accomplished while safeguarding
the juror's valid privacy interests. Even then a valid privacy right may rise to a level that part of the transcript
should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect
the person from embarassment.
The judge at this trial closed an incredible six weeks of voir
dire without considering alternatives to closure. Later the
court declined to release a transcript of the voir dire even
while stating that "most of the information" in the transcript
was "dull and boring." Supra, at--. Sensitive material
reasonably entitled to privacy could have been strickeirDr
sealed without such a sweeping order. Some effort should
have been directed to identifying such materiaL
Assuming that some jurors had protectible privacy interests in some of their answers, the trial judge provided no explanation why his broad order denying access to information
at the voir dire was not limited to information that was actu-

82-55~0PINION

PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT ·

11

ally sensitive and deserving of privacy protection. Nor did
he consider whether he could disclose the substance of the
sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved.
Thus not only was there a failure to articulate findings with
the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and possible partial releases of
the transcript.
~
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is vacated, and the
case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Subject to the comments be1ow, t ' will be qlad to
join your opinion.
l.

On p. 8 your opl n ion

t=;ta tes:

"Of coursa the right of an accusPd to fundamental fairness and the riqht of prospective
;urors to privacv are comnelling interests."
Although I think other portions of your opinion do not
equate the two "rights" in such absolute terms, I woul~ find
it difficult to agree that "privacy" in the ordinarv sense
extends to a nerson who is called tn serve on the 1ury.
Such a person's privacy, for example, if' not comparnhle to
Fourth Amendment privacv. In this case - a~ you make clear
elsewhere - we are concPrned onl with the limited privacy ~
juror rnav have where it is dernonstrablP that a truthful answer to votr dire questions would disclose highly Pr vate
personal information (e.g., rape victim).
y guess ~s that
many of. the questions that properJy mE~y he asked iurors in' volve some el~~ent of embarrassment for a s~nsitive juror,
e.q., "Row long have you been une:!lployed?", · and "Have you
ever brought a damage suit and lost it?

,

2. It seems to me that the opinion, partjcularlv
the last two oaragr~ph8 in Part III (pp. 10,11) do not make
clear enough that certainly the greater part of the voir
dire transcript in this case should be disclosed to the public. T;e last sentence i~ the first of these paragraphs (p.
10) Rtates merf'ly that "soMe effort" should be made to identify the confidential material. And on p. Jl the draft
' states there was "a failure to consider alternatives to closure and possible partial releases of the transcript" (p.
11). Should we not order that only clearly confidential
voir dire examinations he excised and that the remainder be
released?
·
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Dear Chief,
I agree.
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No. 82-556

Press-Enterprise Canpany
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Dear Chief,
I have joined your op1n1on in the
aoove but would feel more comfortable if
you could accommodate Thurgood's concern
as expressed in his opinion concurring
in the judgment. Can you do so?
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

January 5, 1984
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82-556 Press Enterprise
Dear Chief:
For the most part, your c:;uqqested changes are
quite helpful and are fine with me.
On page 9, second paragraph, I suggest a modest
change such as the language I have underscored:
"The iury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of the prospective ;urors when interroqation touches on rleeoly personaL matters that
a person has legitimate rea~ons for keeping
out of the public rlomain."
The change would merely give some idea as to the
"matters" as to which a person may have a legitimate reason
for confidentiality.

On page 10, I suggest that your second chanqe read
as follows:
"A trial judge must explain why the material
is entitled to privacy" .
As this case i.llustrates , some iudqes rule t.,ithout
giving any satisfactory explanation. The l~nquage I Ruggest
is a bit stronger than requiring merely that the iudqe give
"~ome explanation".
I appreciate your qivinq me the opportunity to
comment on your changes that I think do signi.fic~ntly
strengthen the opinion . My suggestions are for exrnphasis ,
and to make trial judges toe the line .

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

82-556

PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
RIVERSIDE COUNTY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
[January-, 1984]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of
open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings
for the voir dire examination of potential jurors.
I
Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was tried and convicted of
the rape and murder of a teenage girl, and sentenced to death
in California Superior Court. Before the voir dire examination of prospective jurors began, petitioner, Press-Enterprise Co., moved that the voir dire be open to the public and
the press. Petitioner contended that the public had an absolute right to attend the trial, and asserted that the trial commenced with the voir dire proceedings. The State opposed
petitioner's motion, arguing that if the press were present,
juror responses would lack the candor necessary to assure a
fair trial.
The trial judge agreed and permitted petitioner to attend
only the "general voir dire." He stated that counsel would
conduct the "individual voir dire with regard to death qualifications and any other special areas that counsel may feel
some problem with regard to ... in private .... " App. 93.
The voir dire consumed six weeks and all but approximately
three days was closed to the public.
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Mter the jury was empaneled, petitioner moved the trial
court to release a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge
described the responses of prospective jurors at their voir
dire:
"Most of them are of little moment. There are a few,
however, in which some personal problems were discussed which could be somewhat sensitive as far as
publication of those particular individual's situations are
concerned." App. 103.
Counsel for Brown argued that release of the transcript
would violate the jurors' right of privacy. The prosecutor
agreed, adding that the prospective jurors had answered
questions under an "implied promise of confidentiality."
App. 111. The court denied petitioner's motion, concluding
as follows:
"I agree with much of what defense counsel and People's
counsel have said and I also, regardless of the public's
right to know, I also feel that's rather difficult that by a
person performing their civic duty as a prospective juror
putting their private information as open to the public
which I just think there is certain areas that the right of
privacy should prevail and a right to a fair trial should
prevail and the right of the people to know, I think
should have some limitations, so at this stage, the motion
to open up the individual sequestered voir dire proceedings is denied without prejudice." App. 121.
Mter Brown had been convicted and sentenced to death,
petitioner again applied for release of the transcript. In denying this application, the judge stated:
"The jurors were questioned in private relating to past
experiences, and while most of the information is dull
and boring, some of the jurors had some special experiences in sensitive areas that do not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." App. 39.
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Petitioner then sought in the California Court of Appeal a
writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to release the
transcript and vacate the order closing the voir dire proceedings. The petition was denied. The California Supreme
Court denied petitioner's request for a hearing. We granted
certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983). We reverse.
II

The trial of a criminal case places the factfinding function in
a jury of twelve unless by statute or consent the jury is fixed
at a lesser number or a jury is waived. The process of juror
selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the
adversaries but to the criminal justice system. In Richrrwnd Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 569
(1980), the plurality opinion summarized the evolution of the
criminal trial as we know it today and concluded that "at the
time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
both here and in England had long been presumptively
open." A review of the historical evidence is also helpful for
present purposes. It reveals that, since the development of
trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for good
cause shown.
A
The roots of open trials reach back to the days before the
Norman Conquest when cases in England were brought before "moots" a town meeting kind of body such as the local
court of the hundred or the county court. 1 Attendance was
virtually compulsory on the part of the freemen of the community, who represented the "patria," or the "country," in
rendering judgment. The public aspect thus was "almost a
necessary incident of jury trials, since the presence of a jury
1

Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 1 Select Essarys

in Anglo-American Legal History 88, 89 (1907).
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already insured the presence of a large part of the
public." 2
As the jury system evolved in the years after the Norman
Conquest, and the jury came to be but a small segment representing the community, the obligation of all freeman to attend criminal trials was relaxed; however, the public character of the proceedings, including jury selection, remained
unchanged. Later, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the jury became an impartial trier of facts, owing in
large part to a development in that period, allowing challenges.3 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332,
335 (7th ed. 1956). Since then, the accused has generally enjoyed the right to challenge jurors in open court at the outset
of the trial. 4
Although there appear to be few contemporary accounts of
the process of jury selection of that day,S one early record
2

Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381, 388 (1932); see 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (13th ed. 1800).
8
In 1352, a statute was enacted to permit challenges to petit jurors on
the ground of their participation as "indicators" on the presenting jury. 25
Edw. 3, C. 3, § 5; see T. Plunkett, A Concise History of Common Law 109
(1929). Objections had always been allowed on grounds of personal hostility. 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 332, 324-25 (7th ed.
1956).
• In Peter Cook's Trial, 4 Har. St. Tr. 736, 738-740 (0. B. 1696), the
accused himself attempted to pose questions directly to jurors in order to
sustain challenges. "You may ask upon a Voyer Dire, whether he [the juror] have any Interest in the Cause; nor shall we deny you Liberty to ask
whether he be fitly qualified, according to Law by having a Freehold of
sufficent Value." Id., at 736. And in Harrison's Trial, 2 Har. St. Tr.
309, 313 (0. B. 1660), the reporter remarks that the defendant's persistence in challenging jurors provoked laughter in the courtroom: "Here the
People seemed to laugh," he writes, upon the defendant's tenth peremptory challenge.
6
As noted in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 565 n. 5, it is not
surprising that there is little in the way of contemporary record of the
openness of those early trials. Historians have commented that early Anglo-Saxon laws "deal rather with the novel and uncertain, than with the
normal and undoubted rules of law. . . . Why trouble to record that which
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written in 1565 places the trial "[i]n the towne house, or in
some open or common place." T. Smith, De Republica
Anglorum 96 (Alston ed. 1906). Smith explained that "there
is nothing put in writing but the enditement":
"All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the
Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so
many as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all
depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men
may heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses what is saide." !d., at 101 (emphasis added).
If we accept this account it appears that beginning in the sixteenth century, jurors were selected in public.
As the trial began, the judge and the accused were
present. Before calling jurors, the judge "telleth the cause
of their comming, and [thereby] giveth a good lesson to the
people." !d., at 9&-97 (emphasis added). The indictment
was then read; if the accused pleaded not guilty, the jurors
were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant
was allowed to make his challenges. I d., at 98. Smith
makes clear that the entire trial proceeded "openly, that not
only the xii [12 jurors], but the Judges, the parties and as
many [others] as be present may heare." !d., at 79 (emphasis added).
This open process gave assurance to those not attending
trials that others were able to observe the proceedings and
enhanced public confidence. The presence of bystanders
served yet another purpose according to Blackstone. If
challenges kept a sufficient number of qualified jurors from
appearing at the trial, "either party may pray a tales." 3 W.
Blackstone, supra, at 364; see also M. Hale, The History of
the Common Law of England 342 (6th ed. 1820). A "tales"
was the balance necessary to supply the deficiency. 6
every village elder knows?" E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law
3-4 (2d ed. 1922).
6
By the statute 35 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1543), the judge was empowered to
award a "tales de circumstantibus, of persons present in court, to be joined
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The presumptive openness of the jury selection process in
England, not surprisingly, carried over into proceedings in
colonial America. For example, several accounts noted the
need for talesmen at the trials of Thomas Preston and William Wemms, two of the British soldiers who were charged
with murder after the so-called Boston Massacre in 1770. 7
Public jury selection thus was the common practice in America when the Constitution was adopted.
B

For present purposes, how we allocate the "right" to openness as between the accused and the public, or whether we
view it as a component inherent in the system benefitting
both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of
the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's
right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the
community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of justice today as it did for centuries before our
separation from England. The value of openness lies in the
fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness
so essential to public confidence in the system.
to the other jurors to try the cause." 3 W. Blackstone, supra, at 365. If
the judge issued such a writ, the sheriff brought forward "talesmen" from
among the bystanders in the courtroom. These talesmen were then subject to the same challenges as the others.
7
3 Legal Papers of John Adams 18 (1965) (quoting William Palfrey to
John Wilkes, Oct. 1770, in Elsey, "John Wilkes and William Palfrey," 34
Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 411, 423-425 (1943)); id., at 49 n. 9 (quoting Acting
Governor Thomas Hutchinson in C. B. Mayo ed., Additions to Hutchinson's History 32); id., at 100.
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Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at
569-571.
This openness has what is sometimes described as a "community therapeutic value." Id., at 570. Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even
outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community
urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done. See T.
Reik, The Compulsion to Confess ~295, 408 (1959).
Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrelevant. When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an
outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and
emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet
and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public
proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the
community in knowing that offenders are being brought to
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly
selected. See United States v. Hasting, --U.S. - - ,
- - (1983); Morris v. Slappy, - - U . S . - - , - - (1983).
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572. Closed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that
outweighs the value of openness. 8 In Globe Newspaper
v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596 (1982), we stated that:

Co. ,

8
That for certain purposes, e. g., double jeopardy, a trial begins when
the first witness, Wade v. Hunter, 366 U. S. 684, 688 (1949), or the jurors,
Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963), are sworn does not bear
on the question presented here. The rules of attachment of jeopardy represent the broad perception that the Government's action has reached the
point where its power to retrace its steps must be checked by the "countervailing interests of the individual protected by the double jeopardy clause
of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Velazquez, 490 F. 2d 29, 34
(CA2 1973); accord United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 480 (1971). By
contrast, the question we address-whether the voir dire process must be
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"[T]he circumstances under which the press and public
can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the
State's justification in denying access must be a weighty
one. Where ... the State attempts to deny the right of
access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." I d., at 606-607.
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine
whether the closure order was properly entered. We now
turn to whether the presumption of openness has been rebutted in this case.
·
III
Although three days of voir dire in this case were open to
the public, six weeks of the proceedings were closed, and media requests for the transcript were denied. 9 The Superior
Court asserted two interests in support of its closure order
and orders denying a transcript: the right of the defendant to
a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective jurors,
for any whose "special experiences in sensitive areas ... do
not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Supra,
at - - . Of course the right of an accused to fundamental
fairness in the jury selection process is a compelling interest.
open-focuses on First, rather than Fifth, Amendment values and the historical backdrop against which the First Amendment was enacted.
9
We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length, in and
of itself undermines public confidence in the courts and the legal profession. The process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a favorable one.
Judges, not advocates, must control that process to make sure privileges
are not so abused. Properly conducted it is inconceivable that the process
could extend over such a period. We note, however, that in response to
questions counsel stated that it is not unknown in California courts for jury
selection to extend six months.

I
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But the California court's conclusion that Sixth Amendment
and privacy interests were sufficient to warrant prolonged
closure was unsupported by findings showing that an open
proceeding in fact threatened those interests; 10 hence it is not
possible to conclude that closure was warranted. 11 Even
with findings adequate to support closure, the trial court's orders denying access to voir dire testimony failed to consider
whether alternatives were available to protect the interests
of the prospective jurors that the trial court's orders sought
to guard. Absent consideration of alternatives to closure,
the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire.
The jury selection process may, in some circumstances~
give rise to a compelling interest of the prospective jurors
()/
when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that

I

We have previously noted that in some limited circumstances, closure
may be warranted. Thus a trial judge may, ''in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.
'[T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge . . . the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially
associated with resort to public places."' Richmond Newspapers, 448
U. S., at 555 n. 18 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941)).
11
Petitioner contends that respondent's closure order was based on the
requirement in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80, 616 P. 2d 1301
(1980), that jurors answer voir dire questions concerning juror death qualifications "outside the presence of ... fellow venirepersons." The docket
sheet merely states, however, that petitioner's motion to be admitted to
jury voir dire "is denied and granted in part, as stated on the record."
The transcript of hearing on the motion is unenlightening on this score.
See App. 93. Thus, it is not clear that the judge's ruling was based on
Hovey.
Assuming that Hovey was the basis for the trial court's order, it is unclear that the interests Hovey sought to protect could have justified respondent's closure order. In Hovey, the California Supreme Court focused on studies that indicated that jurors were prejudiced by the answers
of other jurors during voir dire. There was no indication that the presence
of the public or press affected jurors. The California Supreme Court in
fact stated that its decision would not "in any way affect the open nature of
a trial." 28 Cal. 3d, at 80-81.
10

,.
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person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public
domain. The trial involved testimony concerning an alleged
rape of a teenage girl. Some questions may have been appropriate to prospective jurors that would give rise to legitimate privacy interests of those persons. For example a prospective juror might privately inform the judge that she, or a
member of her family, had been raped but had declined to
seek prosecution because of the embarassment and emotional
trauma from the very disclosure of the episode. The privacy
interests of such a prospective juror must be balanced \
against the historic values we have discussed and the need
for opennessof the process.
To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legitimate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control
of the process of jury selection and should inform the array of
prospective jurors, once the general nature of sensitive questions is made known to them, that those individuals believing
public questioning will prove damaging because of
embarassment, may properly request an opportunity to
present the problem to the judge in camera but with counsel
present and on the record.
By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative
request, the trial judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid
basis for a belief that disclosure infringes a significant interest in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of unnecessary closure. The exercise of sound discretion by the
court may lead to excusing such a person from jury service.
When limited closure is ordered, the constitutional values
sought to be protected by holding open proceedings may be
satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceedings available within a reasonable time, if the judge determines that disclosure can be accomplished while safeguarding
the juror's valid privacy interests. Even then a valid privacy right may rise to a level that part of the transcript
should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect
the person from embarassment.
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The judge at this trial closed an incredible six weeks of voir
dire without considering alternatives to closure. Later the
court declined to release a transcript of the voir dire even
while stating that "most of the information" in the transcript
was "dull and boring." Supra, at - - . Those parts of the
transcript reasonably entitled to privacy could have been
sealed without such a sweeping order; a trial judge should explain why the material is entitled to privacy.Assuming that some jurors had protectible privacy interests in some of their answers, the trial judge provided no explanation why his broad order denying access to information
at the voir dire was not limited to information that was actually sensitive and deserving of privacy protection. Nor did
he consider whether he could disclose the substance of the
sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved.
Thus not only was there a failure to articulate :findings with
the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the
transcript. The trial judge should seal only such parts of the
transcript as necessary to preserve the ieeatity of the individuals sought to be protected.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is vacated, and the
case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
op1mon.
It is so ordered.
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a novelty for opinions of this Court to comment on state
practices that affect the administration of justice.
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omit that observation.
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